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Validity of Post-Employment 
Non-Compete Covenants in Broadcast 
News Employment Contracts 
by JON H. SYLVESTER* 
Introduction 
A post-employment non-compete covenant is an agreement 
"by an employee that, after termination of employment, the 
employee will not compete with the former employer-usually 
within a specified geographic area and for a specified period of 
time. These agreements raise significant questions of law and 
policy involving the confrontation between employees' inter-
ests in freedom to earn a livelihood and employers' interests 
in protecting their businesses by limiting the former em-
ployee's post-employment opportunities.1 Ironically, both of 
these interests are generally thought to be protected by free-
dom of contract, which is one reason this confrontation is re-
ceiving increasing attention as post-employment non-compete 
covenants become a standard part of many employment 
contracts.2 
Broadcast news is a highly competitive field featuring sub-
jective employment criteria, poor job security, and high turn-
over. In this context, effective post-employment restrictions 
can be especially significant.3 The news broadcaster whose 
* The author, formerly a professional broadcast journalist, is a graduate of the 
Harvard Law School and an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Southern Univer-
sity in Houston. 
1. Kniffin, Employee Non-Competition Covenants: The Perils of Performing 
Unique Services, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 25 (1978). 
2. Closius & Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial En-
forcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 531, 532 (1984). 
3. Most of the issues discussed in the broadcast news industry arise in connec-
tion with various types of personal services contracts. However, the relatively high 
salaries and subjective employment criteria that prevail in broadcast news give rise 
to certain specific difficulties shared with other performance-related employment, 
such as professional sports. This Article focuses upon broadcast news employment 
contracts, but makes extensive use of other public performance cases in developing 
the applicable principles. 
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employment contract has expired or who has been terminated 
may face limited and unappealing choices: relocate, change 
professions, or sit idle. 
This Article discusses whether, and to what extent, a broad-
cast news employee may be bound by a contractual provision 
that purportedly relinquishes his right to contract subse-
quently for other employment. Specifically, this Article dis-
cusses the applicable law of selected jurisdictions,4 critiques 
the rationale most often used in defending these covenants 
("uniqueness of employee services"), reports the results of a 
survey regarding industry practices, and discusses the distinc-
tions between legal enforceability and practical enforcement. 
Finally, this Article proposes changes in the law, including 
abandonment of the "unique services" rationale and adoption 
of specialized standards by which the validity of such contract 
provisions should be tested. 
I 
Commonalities of the Common Law 
A. Background 
Initially, courts were hostile to post-employment restrictive 
covenants. The earliest recorded case, decided in 1414, in-
volved an agreement by a dyer to refrain from practicing his 
trade for six months after the termination of his employment 
by the covenantee.5 Incensed, the judge refused to issue the 
injunction sought by the covenantee, instead declaring that if 
the plaintiff was present in court, the judge would imprison 
him until the plaintiff paid a fine to the king.6 For nearly 200 
years, case law reflected the belief that these covenants were 
restraints of trade and repugnant to public policy.7 By the 
16th century, however, courts were more accepting of such re-
straints, occasionally allowing enforcement if the covenant 
4. The author originally intended to compare and contrast the laws of those 
jurisdictions containing the country's largest broadcast markets. Research revealed, 
however, that there are only minor differences among the many jurisdictions that 
apply common law principles to the issue of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants; the more notable distinction is between such jurisdictions and those that have 
enacted relevant statutes. 
5. The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, pI. 26 (1414). 
6. Id. 
7. See Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 721-27 (1982). 
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was reasonable in time and geographic scope, and necessary 
for the protection of the covenantee.8 Often the justification 
for enforcement was based on a freedom of contract rationale: 
with modern transportation and decentralization of economic 
activity, an individual covenantor could avoid hardship simply 
by plying his trade in another location.9 
Thus developed the general rule that a contract restraining 
trade was valid if it appeared to be reasonable and was sup-
ported by consideration.10 Indeed, by the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the traditional public policy argument had been 
effectively reversed.ll . As one leading commentator noted: 
The objections to restraint of trade, namely, that it divests the 
promisor of his means of earning a livelihood and of support-
ing himself and family, and that it deprives the community of 
the benefit of his services and the benefit which his competi-
tion might offer, are offset by the more important social inter-
est involved in making the goodwill of a business or other 
property vendible, or in protecting the covenantee in some 
proper interest covered by the contract.12 
Post-employment restrictive covenants of the type thus far 
described contemplate and purport to prohibit an individual's 
direct competition with a former employer, generally as a rival 
entrepreneur. In contrast, the restrictive covenants typically 
contained in broadcast talent contracts are intended to restrict 
the covenantor from working for a third party who is a com-
petitor of the covenantee. This latter form of restriction de-
veloped, at least in part, from a different seed: negative 
covenants prohibiting employees from competing with their 
employers during their employment.13 
The famous English case of Lumley v. Wagner14 provides an 
example. Lumley involved a personal services contract under 
which opera singer Wagner was to perform exclusively at 
Lumley's theater for three months.15 When it appeared that 
8. See id at 727-29. 
9. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 637-
38 (1982). 
10. Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244, 246 
(1928). 
11. See id. at 253-54. 
12. Id. at 254. 
13. See generally Tannenbaum, En/'orcement of Personal Service Contracts in 
the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18 (1954). 
14. 1 De G.M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852). 
15. Id. 
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Wagner would sing elsewhere during the proscribed period, 
Lumley sought specific enforcement of the contract.16 Ulti-
mately, the court enjoined Wagner from performing else-
where, but declined to force her to sing at Lumley'S theatreP 
The intent, and probable impact, of a negative covenant like 
the one in Lumley is two-fold. First, its enforcement will tend 
to encourage performance of the affirmative obligation by de-
priving the covenantor of alternative employment. This justi-
fication, however, is legally inadequate because it indirectly 
attempts to force performance when the law will not do so 
directly through an injunction.18 A covenantor who is not co-
erced iilto performing is punished through the resulting in-
come 10ss.19 
Second, even if the covenantor is not induced to perform, 
enforcement of the covenant protects the covenantee from 
certain competition. This protection is the more accepted ra-
tionale for enforcement of restrictive covenants.20 Professor 
Williston states: 
In most of the decisions . . . the negative undertaking of the 
defendant had importance to the plaintiff apart from the pres-
sure which its enforce~ent would put upon the defendant to 
perform his affirmative undertaking, and if the defendant's 
performance of his negative obligation has no value to the 
plaintiff in itself an injunction will not generally be 
granted. . .. In general, it is not the mere taking of new em-
ployment but unfair competition which equity enjoins.21 
The post-employment non-compete covenants found in most 
broadcast talent contracts constitute a blend of these two con-
tractual concepts. Like the covenant in Lumley, present day 
covenants address the sale of public performance services to a 
third party competitor of the covenantee, and, like the earliest 
cases (but unlike Lumley), they arise 'only after the covenan-
tor's employment ends. These covenants are, thus, post-em-
ployment restrictions on "indirect" competition which prevent 
an employee from providing services to a third party competi-
tor of the former employer. Under the common law of con-
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4 (1982). 
19. Id. 
20. 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1450 (rev. ed. 
1937). 
21. Id. 
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tracts, this hybrid, like non-compete covenants in general, is 
initially suspect as a restraint ~f trade.22 
A strong presumption of unfairness accompanies post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants because of policy concerns, 
such as the superior bargaining power almost invariably 
wielded by the employer.23 Nevertheless, as discussed below, 
such covenants are frequently enforced. 
B. Reasonableness, Divisibility and Modification 
According to modern common law interpretation, post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants are enforceable if supported 
by consideration and reasonable as to geographic scope, dura-
tion, and range of activities prohibited.24 Reasonableness is 
evaluated against the backdrop of an ostensibly independent 
determination regarding the legitimacy of the business inter-
est the former employer is trying to protect.25 Although a mi-
nority of jurisdictions will declare an entire covenant void if 
portions of the provision are found unreasonable,26 many 
courts will either partially enforce post-employment non-com-
pete covenants, or modify the offending portions and enforce 
the covenants as modified.27 The governing principle is that 
partial enforcement must not be "against public policy or ... 
injurious to the public interest ... [or] unnecessarily injurious 
to the covenantor, and must not go beyond what is reasonably 
necessary to protect the interests of the covenantee."28 
In determining whether a partially illegal non-compete cov-
enant might be partially enforceable, courts traditionally 
looked at the divisibility of the reasonable restrictions from 
the excessive restraints imposed by the covenant. This "blue 
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1979). 
23. Id. at § 188 comment g. 
24. Id. at § 188 comment d; see, e.g., Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 
S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1960). 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1979) provides that a non-
compete covenant is unreasonable if: "(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to 
protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed 
by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public." 
26. Annotation, Enforceability, Insofar as Restrictions Would be Reasonable, of 
Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61 A.L.R.3d 397, 418 
(1975). See also Purcell v. Joyner, 231 Ga. 85, 86-87, 200 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1973); Rec-
tor-Phillips Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1973). 
27. Annotation, supra note 26, at 410-17. 
28. Id. at 408. 
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pencil" test became the standard of divisibility:29 
By this rule, the divisibility of a promise in excessive restraint 
of trade is determined by purely mechanical means: if the 
promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be elimi-
nated by crossing out a few of the words with a ''blue pencil," 
while at the same time the remaining words constitute a com-
plete and valid contract, the contract as thus ''blue pencilled" 
will be enforced.30 
Although many courts still employ divisibility language, the 
"blue pencil" test has virtually been abandoned.31 In Illinois, 
for example, unreasonable restrictions contained within a 
post-employment non-compete covenant "may be modified 
and enforced to the extent reasonable [as long] as it appears 
from the terms of the covenant that the restrictions are sever-
able .... "32 In Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck,33 the 
plaintiff (Statistical) sought to enjoin Hauck from competing 
with Statistical in violation of a post-employment non-compete 
covenant included in Hauck's employment contract.34 The 
trial court granted Statistical's request for a permanent in-
junction against Hauck's business, modifying the covenant, 
however, to reduce the proscribed geographical area.3S 
The trial court's decision in Hauck clearly demonstrates a 
willingness to modify a covenant to make it enforceable.36 
29. S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, at § 1659. 
30. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962). 
31. The ''blue pencil" test is rejected by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
as "now contrary to the weight of authority." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 184 reporter's note (1979). 
32. See Esmarck, Inc. v. McKee, ll8 Ariz. 5ll, 514, 578 P.2d 190, 193 (1978) (ap-
plying Illinois law); see also Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck, 10 Ill. App. 3d 50, 
293 N.E.2d 900 (1973). 
33. 10 Ill. App. 3d 50, 293 N.E.2d 900 (1973). 
34. The covenant agreed to by Hauck provided: 
[I]n consideration of ... [his] employment by the corporation ... upon ter-
mination of his employment . . . he would not for two years thereafter . . . 
engage in a business similar or competitive to that of ... [Statistical] within 
a radius of 100 miles from any part of 19 other designated cities in various 
parts of the United States from California to New York ... or within a 
radius of 100 miles from any part of any city in which ... [Statistical] or an 
affiliated company was operating at the time his employment was 
terminated. 
Id. at 51, 293 N.E.2d at 901. 
35. Id. at 52, 293 N.E.2d at 901-02. 
36. Id. The Appeals Court of Illinois held that the covenant was unreasonable 
and that no showing was made as to "possible irreparable injury or grave necessity 
for the imposition of restraint by the covenant [even] as modified to afford reason-
able protection to the rights of the employer." Id. 
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Although willing to change a term, however, the Illinois 
courts seem unwilling to supply a missing term. In Akhter v. 
Shah,37 an Illinois appellate court held that "where the origi-
nal restriction neither provides a time limitation nor clearly 
identifies the ... [territorial limits] in which the practice is to 
be prohibited, the restriction, which is too vague and ambigu-
ous, should not be rewritten by the court."38 
Some jurisdictions have expressly abandoned formal divisi-
bility.39 Others employ different principles depending upon 
the circumstances involved. For example, New York courts 
have held that the divisibility requirement is dependent upon 
the nature of the contract.40 In New York, strict (i.e., formal 
or technical) divisibility of the contract is required for the 
modification of a non-compete clause contained in an agree-
ment for the sale of a business, but is not required in connec-
tion with the modification of such clauses in employment 
contracts.41 
Many courts have adopted the practice of applying stricter 
standards to test the enforceability of non-compete covenants 
in employment contracts, as distinguished from those in con-
tracts for the sale' of a business.42 In a further effort to dis-
courage attempts by employers to obtain unjustifiably broad 
protection, even those courts willing to modify a non-compete 
covenant will generally refuse to do so if they conclude that 
the covenant was drafted or included in bad faith.43 
1. Geographic Scope 
When an express territorial restriction is unreasonably 
broad, it can be modified by limiting it to the area in which 
the former employee performed duties for his or her former 
employer.44 Some courts have further held that in a case 
37. 119 Ill. App. 3d 131, 456 N.E.2d 232 (1983). 
38. Id. at 135, 456 N.E.2d at 235. 
39. See, e.g., Hill v. Central West Pub. Serv. Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930). 
40. See John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1931); Consoli-
dated Syrup Corp. v. Kaiser, 22 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1940). 
41. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d at 116. 
42. See, e.g., American Hot Rod Assoc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974); 
accord C.G. Caster Co. v. Regan, 43 Ill. App. 3d 663, 357 N.E.2d 162 (1976). The 
differentiated standard dates back at least to Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P.WMS. 181,24 
Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). 
43. E. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 363. 
44. See Eubank v. Puritan Chemical Co., 353 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962); 
Central Keystone Plating of Illinois, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 62 Ill. App. 2d 188, 210 
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where there is n9 express territorial restriction, the prohibi-
tion can be limited to the territory in which the former em-
ployee carried out his duties for the employer,45 or to the 
employer's business area.46 If the covenant in question is part 
of a broadcast talent employment contract, the "employer's 
business area" and the "area in which the employee per-
formed duties for his employer" are both generally defined by 
the area reached by the broadcast signal (i.e., the "broadcast 
market"). Some courts have held that post-employment non-
compete covenants may be limited by judicial modification to 
the former employer's customers.47 The "employer's custom-
ers" concept, however, is not particularly useful in relation to 
broadcast talent employment contracts. The broadcast em-
ployer's customers are its advertisers, but it is audience share, 
not advertisers, that broadcast employers primarily seek to 
protect from what they argue is unfair competition. 
The geographic reasonableness requirement was applied to a 
broadcast talent non-compete provision in Wake BroadCasters, 
Inc. v. Crawford. 48 In this 1960 Georgia case, the plaintiff 
broadcast station was denied an injunction enforcing Craw-
ford's covenant not to engage in radio or television work 
within fifty miles of any city in which the plaintiff operated, 
despite the fact that the Crawford's broadcasts were aired in 
only one broadcast market.49 This covenant was to be effec-
tive for eighteen months after the termination of Crawford's 
employment with the plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme Court 
said this restriction went far beyond what was necessary to 
protect the plaintiff's legitimate business interests and would 
cause impermissible hardship to the defendant if he was pre-
vented from working in six states on the mere basis of the 
N.E.2d 239 (1965); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974); 
Martin v. Kidde Sales and Services, 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). 
45. See Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 345 Mass. 737, 189 N.E.2d 559 (1963); McAnally v. 
Person, 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933). 
. 46. See Brannen v. Bouley, 272 Mass. 67, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); New England Tree 
Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940); Grace v. Orkin Extermi-
nating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); Thames v. Rotary Engineering Co., 
315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958). 
47. See Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926); Martin v. 
Kidde Sales and Service, 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Career Placement of 
White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 77 Misc. 2d 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1974); Whiting Milk Co. 
v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1931). 
48. 215 Ga. 862, 114 S.E.2d 26 (1960). 
49. Id. at 863, 114 S.E.2d at 28. 
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plaintiff corporation's legal presence in those states. 50 Thus, 
the court affirmed the trial court's dismissai"of the plaintiff's 
petition for an injunction on the grounds that the restriction 
was geographically unreasonable.51 The court did not attempt 
to modify the restriction to make it enforceable. 
Most post-employment restrictions included in broadcast 
news employment contracts purport to prohibit competition 
within the covenantee's broadcast market. Others define the 
proscribed territory in terms of miles, as in Wake Broadcast-
ers. At least one such covenant, b,anning competition within a 
100 mile radius, has been upheld, but the area identified was 
not significantly different from the relevant broadcast 
market. 52 
2. Duration 
In order to be enforceable, a non-compete covenant gener-
ally must be limited to a reasonable period of time.53 The du-
ration of a typical post-employment non-compete clause in a 
broadcast news talent contract is between three months and 
one year,54 but at least one court has held that a two year pro-
hibition was reasonable in the case of a radio announcer/sales-
man.55 Five years, however, was found unnecessarily long in 
the case of a Boston radio announcer who had already been 
away from the proscribed territory for approximately three 
years after termination of his employment with the 
covenantee.56 
3. Range of Activities Prohibited 
Under the traditional approach, the third element of the 
reasonableness test requires an examination of the range of 
activities banned by the covenant. A narrower ban is more 
likely to be enforceable than a broader one.57 Arguably, a COy-
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Clooney v. WCPO-TV, 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973). 
53. See, e.g., Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); 
Schmidl v. Central Laundry Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1939); Justin Belt Co. v. 
Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973). 
54. See in,fra Section IlIA. 
55. Murray v. Lowndes County Broadcasting Co., 248 Ga. 587, 284 S.E.2d 10 
(1981). 
56. Richmond Bros. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting ~o., 357 Mass. 106, 256 N.E.2d 
304 (1970). 
57. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1981); 
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enant purporting to ban a former employee's pursuit of an en-
tire occupation, even within a limited geographical area, 
should never be enforceable.58 Nevertheless, the post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants typically included in broadcast 
news employment contracts almost invariably seek to impose 
complete (albeit geographically limited) occupational bans. 
Such bans bring into sharp focus the policy issues associated 
with non-compete covenants.59 
C. Employer's Business Interest 
Post-employment restrictive covenants are enforceable only 
if they seek to protect a legitimate business interest of the for-
mer employer.6o Traditionally, such interests comprised only 
proprietary information, notably trade secrets and customer 
lists.61 Nevertheless, courts sometimes enforce restrictive cov-
enants on the most rudimentary of contract law principles 
(e.g., that the covenant was part of a bargained-for-ex-
change).62 This approach ignores the public policy against re-
straints of trade, and allows enforcement of covenants even 
when the interest for which the former employer seeks pro-
tection is not specified. 
The better approach is for the court to require that the em-
ployer show a protectable interest, and then expand the "ap-
proved list" if the employer's legitimate interest is neither 
trade secrets nor customer lists. This approach has led to the 
addition of a new and problematic consideration-the unique-
ness of an employee's services-to the list of protectable em-
ployer interests. 
Increasingly, "uniqueness of employee's services" has been 
recognized as a legitimate and protectable interest of the em-
ployer.63 In Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman,64 the New 
Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, 431, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (1979); Karpinski v. 
Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 50, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1971). 
58. See generally Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2. 
59. See in/ra section IIIB. 
60. See Blake, supra note 9, at 649. 
61. See id. Some authors have gone further and argued that "only trade secrets 
or confidential' information constitute a protectable interest sufficient to justify any 
form of post-associational restraint." Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 551 (em-
phasis added). 
62. See, e.g., Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976). 
63. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 26; Tannenbaum, supra note 13, at 21. 
64. 40 N.Y.2d 303, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). 
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York Court of Appeals refused to enforce a restrictive cove-
nant, but suggested that if the employee had rendered unique 
services to his employer, the covenant would have been 
enforced.65 
Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz66 illustrates the emergence 
of the uniqueness standard as an independent basis for en-
forcement of a post-employment restrictive covenant. 
Purchasing Associates, Inc. (Purchasing Associates) was en-
gaged in data processing and hired Weitz for a two year period. 
Weitz's employment agreement provided that, for two years 
following termination of his employment, he would not com-
pete with his former employer in any area located within 
three hundred miles of New York City. The covenant de-
scribed Weitz's services as "special, unique and extraordi-
nary."67 Mter one year, Weitz resigned, established his own 
company, and began competing within the proscribed geo-
graphic area. Purchasing Associates sought an injunction to 
prohibit Weitz from violating the covenant. The New York 
Court of Appeals concluded that, although uniqueness could 
afford a basis for injunctive relief against the former em-
ployee, Weitz did not in fact perform unique services.68 
Although the covenant was not ultimately enforced, the op-
inion is important for two reasons. First, it established 
uniqueness of employee services as an independently protect-
able employer interest, rather than merely an additional fac-
tor to be considered in seeking to protect trade secrets or 
customer lists.69 Additionally, the court enunciated a standard 
for "uniqueness," explaining that "more must ... be shown" 
than that the individual "excels at his work" or that his serv-
ices are of great value to the employer.7o In short, "there must 
be a finding that the employee's services are of such character 
as to make replacement impossible or that the loss of such 
services would cause the employer irreparable injury."71 
Other jurisdictions· generally purport to apply this stan-
65. Id. at 308, 353 N.E.2d at 593. 
66. 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963). 
67. Id. at 270, 196 N.E.2d at 246. 
68. Id. at 274, 196 N.E.2d at 249. 
69. Id. at 272, 196 N.E.2d at 248. 
70. Id. at 274, 196 N.E.2d at 249. 
71. Id. 
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dard.72 Unfortunately, the standard has at least two problems. 
First, it is not clear, in practice, whether the employee's serv-
ices must be truly unique or just very important to the cove-
nantee. Second, and far more important, even if the services 
are unique, "there is no significant correlation between [the] 
uniqueness of the employee's services and the reasonableness 
of restraining him from accepting employment with a compet-
ing employer."73 
The standard's ambiguity is illustrated by Bradford v. New 
York Times CO.,74 a suit contesting the enforceability of a post-
employment restrictive covenant stipulating the forfeiture of 
retirement benefits as liquidated damages. Bradford worked 
for the New York Times for 16 years, during which time he 
served in various corporate capacities including general man-
ager, vice president, and director. After leaving the New York 
Times, Bradford violated the covenant by going to work for a 
competitor.75 The New York Times terminated his retirement 
benefits, which amounted to approximately one-half million 
dollars.76 Bradford sued. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the restrictive covenant on the basis of Brad-
ford's uniqueness, which it found inherent in his "broad and 
vital corporate responsibilities" and his position as the "No. 2 
executive" at the New York Times.77 While the court's posi-
tion has intuitive appeal, the decision is problematic. It may 
be assumed that the "No.2 executive" must have had virtually 
unfettered access to proprietary information (e.g., trade secrets 
and customer lists), but if the court was protecting proprietary 
information, it did not need the uniqueness standard. If it was 
protecting some other interest, the court should clearly have 
identified that interest. 
A more troublesome aspect of protecting an employer's in-
terest in the "uniqueness of employee services" is that the for-
mer employee's skills and abilities, even if developed and/or 
enhanced while working for the former employer, belong to 
72. Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Not To Compete Involving Radio or 
Television Personality, 36 A.L.R.4th 1139 (1985). 
73. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 27. 
74. SOl F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974). 
75. Id. at 55. 
76. Id. at 57 n.3. 
77. Id. at 58. 
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the employee, not the employer.78 Therefore, they should not 
constitute a legitimate basis for the restraint.79 
Moreover, even if the employee's departure causes irrepara-
ble harm to the former employer, enforcement of the negative 
covenant will not make the covenantee whole, but will only 
punish the covenantor. Punishment is not generally consid-
ered a proper objective of contract law, even in the event of 
breach.80 A fortiori, punishment is an improper objective 
when the employment contract has not been breached, but has 
merely expired pursuant to its express terms. Nevertheless, 
the uniqueness rationale is applied generally' to entertainment 
and public performance employment contracts, including per-
sonal services contracts in the broadcast news industry.81 It is 
particularly troublesome that post-employment non-compete 
covenants in broadcast news talent contracts almost invariably 
seek to impose complete occupational bans.82 If, as suggested 
above, it is questionable whether the uniqueness of employee 
services can reasonably be said to constitute an "employer's 
business interest," certainly "uniqueness" should not support 
an outright prohibition on the pursuit of an entire occupation, 
even within a limited geographical area. 
The argument in favor of enforcing post-employment non-
compete covenants in broadcast news talent employment con-
tracts is that such contracts typically run for terms of two to 
five years and the marketability of the employee within the 
relevant broadcast market at the conclusion of the contract's 
term results largely from exposure gained during the term of 
the employment contract. The real interest for which the cov-
enantee seeks protection is not the inherent uniqueness of the 
covenantor's performance, but the covenantee's investment in 
marketing that performance.83 
7S. See, e.g., Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 227, 160 N.E. S04, S06 
(192S). 
79. C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1391B (Supp. 1984); Hallmark Person-
nel of Texas v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933,936 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); Club Aluminum Co. 
v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 227, 160 N.E. S04, S06 (192S). 
SO. E. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note IS, at § 12.S. 
S1. For.citations to cases demonstrating the application of this rule to contracts 
involving actors, athletes and other performers, see Tannenbaum, supra note 13, at 
nn.10-20. 
S2. See sample language excerpted from contracts, inj'ra section IlIA. 
S3. The inaccuracy of the "uniqueness" label is manifest when an employer has 
chosen not to renew the contract of the willing employee, but still wants to preclude 
the employee from accepting "competing" employment, or when an employer has 
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This concept was illustrated in the 1982 Georgia case of 
Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting COrp.84 In Beckman, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court upheld a post-employment restrictive cove-
nant with a duration of 180 days and a territory encompassing 
the area within thirty-five miles of the covenantee's offices. 
Beckman did not contend that these limits were unreasona-
ble.85 The issue in this case was whether prohibition of the 
broadcast of Beckman's voice or image within the specified 
time period and area was unnecessarily broad. In holding for 
the broadcasting company, the court expressly considered the 
company's significant investment in the development and pro-
motion of Beckman's image in the local broadcast market, 
both individually and as a part of the station's "news team."86 
Thus, the court found that the company had a protectable 
business interest in the former employee's . local popularity to 
the extent that such popularity resulted from promotional ef-
forts by the company.87 This approach has the appeal of 
candor and affords a rational basis for invoking the otherwise 
irrational "uniqueness" factor. As one commentator has 
observed: 
[T]he loss against which courts protect the employer is . . . a 
loss that begins with the departure of the employee but is 
compounded when he assumes a competitive position. If the 
employee is truly irreplaceable, then his rendering of services 
to a competitor creates a loss ... which the market system 
cannot compensate.88 
D. Consideration for Employee's Covenant 
As with contracts in general, a non-compete covenant must 
be supported by consideration to be enforceable.89 If the non-
compete covenant is executed simultaneously with, and as part 
of, an employment contract, the employment itself constitutes 
consideration for the covenant.90 In the majority of jurisdic-
made disparaging remarks about an employee, but then argues that the employee 
renders "unique and extraordinary" services. See, e.g., Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, 
Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). 
84. 250 Ga. 127, 296 S.E.2d 566 (1982). 
85. Id. at 129, 296 S.E.2d at 568. 
86. Id. at 130, 296 S.E.2d at 569. 
87. Id. 
88. Kniffin, supra. note 1, at 54. 
89. Annotation, Sufficiency of Con.sideration for Employee's Covenant Not To 
Compete, Entered Into After Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 828 (1973). 
90. Id. 
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tions, however, mere continuation of employment does not 
constitute consideration for a covenant entered into after the 
inception of employment. In these jurisdictions new consider-
ation, in the form of additional benefits to the employee, must 
be provided by the employer for the covenant to be valid.91 
Typical . benefits include promotions, salary increases, and 
annuities.92 
A minority of jurisdictions, including Texas, Massachusetts, 
Illinois, and New York, find that continued employment is 
sufficient consideration for the enforcement of a post-employ-
ment non-compete covenant.93 In McAnally v. Person,94 the 
Texas Court of Appeals ruled that, although the employee had 
worked three months before execution of the covenant, con-
tinued employment was sufficient consideration.95 Although 
continued employment is sometimes held to be sufficient con-
sideration in New York, in Stover v. Gamewell Five Alarm 
Telephone Co.,oo a New York court seemed to take the position 
that an annuity contract executed by an employer in favor of 
his employee was necessary consideration for the employee's 
non-compete covenant entered into after commencement of 
employment.97 
E. Present Day Judicial Enforcement 
There is a paucity of case law regarding post-employment 
non-compete covenants in the broadcast news industry. One 
commentator's insights on a similar situation in the entertain-
ment industry aptly describe the problem in the broadcast 
news context: 
[I]f a dispute arises between an employer and an artist, the 
threat of court action is usually sufficient to induce the par-
ties to compromise and settle out of court. Careers in the en-
tertainment field are typically short-lived; if the artist drops 
from public view for any length of time his or her career may 
be dealt a fatal blow.98 
91. Id. at 830. 
92. Id. 
·93. Id. at 828. 
94. 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933). 
95. Id. at 948. 
96. 149 N.Y.S. 650 (1914). 
97. Id. at 652. 
98. Grogan, Statutory Minimum Compensation and the Granting of Injunctive 
RelW to Eriforce Personal Services Contracts in the Entertainment Industries: The 
Need for Legislative Rliform, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 489, 491 (1964). 
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Many . post-employment non-compete covenants expressly 
state that they are enforceable by injunction. Despite such a 
proclamation, courts, and not the parties to a contract, must 
determine whether the prerequisites for the issuance of an 
injunction have been met. While the parties to a contract may 
attempt to provide for an equitable remedy such as liquidated 
damages or injunctive relief, such provisions are not binding 
upon a court. The alternative remedy is monetary damages 
with the associated difficulty of establishing and determining 
the extent of ·injury. Therefore, despite the difficulty of meet-
ing its requirements, the negative injunction is the most 
common means of judicial enforcement of personal services 
contracts in the broadcast news and entertainment 
industries.99 
An employer attempting to meet the requirements for equi-
table relief is defeated at the outset if unable to show a 
probability of success on the merits with respect to the funda-
mental issue: breach of contract. This was the result of a 1968 
Florida suit in which the defendant radio commentator had 
signed an agreement including a covenant not to compete for 
eighteen mont.hs following termination of his employment 
"for any reason other than discharge without cause."lOO Citing 
the general policy of opposition to restraints of trade, the 
court interpreted the "ambiguous or doubtful language" of the 
covenant against its enforcement and concluded that the re-
striction would have been triggered if the defendant had quit 
or been fired with cause. Instead, because the contract had 
expired by its stated terms, the court held that the covenant 
never became effective.101 
In Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting 
CO.,102 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a 
trial court's dismissal of a suit by a broadcasting company at-
tempting to enjoin competition by a former employee who had 
been absent from the broadcast market for almost three years. 
The court did not find the covenant unenforceable, but held 
99. Yeam, New Remedial Developments in the Enj'orcement of Personal Service 
Contracts for the Entertainment and Sports Industries: The Rise of Tortious Bad 
Faith Breach of Contract and the Fall of the Speculative Damage Dtifense, 7 LoY. 
L.A. ENT. L.J. 27 (1987). 
100. Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1966). 
101. Storz Broadcasting, 178 So. 2d at 42. 
102. 357 Mass. 106, 256 N.E.2d 304 (1970). 
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that it was unnecessary to enforce the covenant to its full ex-
.tent in order to protect the legitimate business interests of the 
employer, Richmond Brothers, Inc. (Brothers}.lo3 
Brothers hired Gerald Jacoby as a radio announcer and 
moderator of a talk show on WMEX in Boston. The initial 
five year employment contract provided that, for three years 
after Jacoby ceased to be employed by Brothers, he would not 
engage in the radio, television, or advertising business any-
where in New England. A subsequent employment agreement 
between the parties provided Jacoby would not compete' with 
WMEX for five years after termination of his employment 
with Brothers. After Jacoby terminated his employment with 
Brothers, he worked in Chicago for three years. He then re-
turned to Boston, where he began broadcasting for Westing-
house's WBZ television and radio stations. Brothers sued to 
enforce the covenant by injunction. 
The court found the restrictive covenant unreasonably 
long.104 In making this determination, the court looked at the 
nature of Brothers' business, the character of the employment 
involved, the situation of the parties, the necessity of the re-
striction for the protection of the employer's business, and the 
right of the employee to work and earn a livelihood.105 After 
considering these factors, the court concluded that it was "un-
able to perceive any business interest of [Brothers] which mer-
its the length of 'protection' it would receive by the 
enforcement of the covenant."l06 
The court noted that there was no evidence to indicate that 
Brothers had lost any advertisers since Jacoby returned to the 
Boston area. Moreover, the court ruled that Jacoby possessed 
no trade secrets or other pertinent confidential information 
communicated to him during the course of his employment 
with Brothers.107 Next, the court rejected Brothers' claim that 
Jacoby's immediate success upon his return to Boston was a 
direct result of Brothers' expenditures and promotion. The 
court found that the reasons for Jacoby's popularity would be 
difficult to determine and that, in any case, Jacoby's absence 
from the broadcasting area for almost three years sufficiently 
103. Id. at lll, 256 N.E.2d at 308. 
104. Id. at llO, 256 N.E.2d at 307. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 107, 256 N.E.2d at 305. 
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protected Brothers' business interests. lOS 
The court also stated that an employer cannot prevent an 
employee from using skill or intelligence acquired, or in-
creased and improved, through experience or instruction re-
ceived in the course of the employment. Thus, the abilities 
possessed by Jacoby were his own, and his efforts to use such 
abilities to earn a living could not be restricted to protect 
Brothers. The court concluded that enforcement of the cove-
nant beyond the years of Jacoby's absence from Boston would 
merely protect Brothers against ordinary competition.109 
In KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel,110 radio station KWEL in Midland, 
Texas, hired John Prassel as a radio announcer, and included 
a non-compete covenant in his employment contract. Within 
several days of his termination by KWEL, Prassel was em-
ployed by radio station KNAM in Midland as an announcer 
and producer of commercial announcements. The new job en-
tailed the same kind of work that he had performed at KWEL, 
but the stations' formats were different. Prassel acknowl-
edged that he violated the non-compete covenant but denied 
that the violation had caused any damage to KWEL. The trial 
court found that while at KWEL, Prassel did not have any 
selling duties and did not call upon advertising customers.lll 
Therefore, there was no "customer list" issue. On appeal, the 
court held that the terms of the clause were reasonable, but 
that KWEL was not entitled to a temporary injunction to bar 
the announcer from working for another station because there 
was no evidence that KWEL either lost or would lose advertis-
ing customers or audience.1l2 
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf,1l3 a New York case, in-
volved a complex restrictive covenant and efforts by the 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to enjoin Warner 
Wolf, a sportscaster, from employment with rival CBS. ABC 
and Wolf entered into an employment agreement which, fol-
lowing the exercise of a renewal option, was to terminate on 
March 5, 1980. The contract included a "good faith negotiation 
and first refusal" provision1l4 which bound Wolf to negotiate 
108. Id. at 111, 256 N.E.2d at 307. 
109. Id. 
110. 527 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 823. 
113. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363 (1981). 
114. The provision reads as follows: 
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in good faith with ABC for a ninety-day period from Decem-
ber 6, 1979, through March 4, 1980. Negotiations from Decem-
ber 6th through January 19th were to be exclusively with 
ABC. Following expiration of the ninety-day negotiating pe-
riod and the contract on March 5, 1980, Wolf was required, 
before accepting any other offer, to afford ABC a right of first 
refusal. 
Wolf met with ABC in September 1979. At this meeting, 
proposals and counter proposals were offered by Wolf and 
ABC with no acceptance by either. Subsequently, unbe-
knownst to ABC, Wolf met with representatives of CBS, re-
lated his employment requirements, and discussed the first 
refusal and good faith negotiation clause of his ABC contract. 
Wolf also furnished a copy of his ABC contract to CBS. On 
October 12th and 16th, ABC officials and Wolf met again to no 
avail. Finally, on January 2, 1980, ABC agreed to meet sub-
stantially all of Wolf's demands. Wolf rejected the offer. On 
February 1, 1980, after termination of the exclusivity period, 
Wolf and CBS orally agreed on the terms of Wolf's employ-
ment as a sportscaster for WCBS-TV, a CBS-owned station in 
New York. On February 5th, Wolf submitted a letter of resig-
nation to ABC. On February 6th, ABC representatives made 
various offers and promises, but Wolf rejected them. Wolf 
then informed ABC officials that he had made a "gentlemen's 
agreement" with CBS and would leave on March 5th. ABC 
filed suit to enjoin Wolf's employment as a sportscaster with 
CBS and to seek specific enforcement of its right of first 
refusal. 
The trial court ruled that there was no breach of contract 
You [Wolf] agree, if we so elect, during the last ninety (90) days prior to the 
expiration of the extended term of this agreement, to enter into good faith 
negotiations with us for the extension of this agreement on mutually agree-
able terms. You [Wolf] further agree that for the first forty-five (45) days of 
this renegotiation period, you [Wolf] will not negotiate for your services 
with any other person or company· other than WABC-TV or ABC. In the 
event we are unable to reach an agreement for an extension by the expira-
tion of the extended term hereof, you [Wolf] agree that you will not accept, 
in any market for a period of three (3) months following expiration of the 
extended term of this agreement, any offer of employment as a sportscaster, 
sports news reporter, commentator, program host, or analyst in broadcast-
ing (including television, cable television, pay television, or radio) without 
first giving us, in writing, an opportunity to employ you on substantially 
similar terms and you agree to enter into an agreement with us on such 
terms. 
[d. at 395, 420 N.E.2d at 364. 
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and, in any event, equitable relief would be inappropriate. 
The appellate division, although concluding that Wolf had 
breached both parts of the good faith negotiation and first re-
fusal provision, nonetheless affirmed on the ground that equi-
table relief was unwarranted. us 
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that Wolf did not 
breach the right of first refusal by accepting an offer during 
the term of his employment with ABC, but that Wolf had vio-
lated the good faith negotiation clause of the contract.U6 The 
court noted the situations in which injunctive relief could be 
granted. First, the court stated that if, in violation of an ex-
isting contract, an employee· refuses to render services to his 
employer, and the services are unique or extraordinary, an in-
junction may be issued to prevent the employee from using 
those services for another person for the duration of the con-
tract, if allowing the employee to work for another employer 
would certainly result in irreparable harm to the employer,117 
The second situation in which the court permits injunctive 
relief is when the employee has expressly agreed not to com-
pete with the employer following the term of the contract, or 
is threatening to disclose trade secrets or. commit another tor-
tious act. us Nevertheless, the court noted that, even where 
there is an express non-compete covenant, it will be "rigor-
ously examined" and will be specifically enforced only if the 
reasonableness requirements of non-compete covenants are 
met.U9 
The court then acknowledged the general principles regard-
ing enforcement of non-compete covenants and the uniqueness 
requirement and refused to grant equitable relief, stating that 
Wolf did not violate an express non-compete covenant, and 
that such a covenant covering the post-employment period 
would not be implied.120 The court made it clear, however, 
that Wolf had breached his good faith negotiation obligation, 
and that its decision denying equitable relief was without prej-
udice to ABC's right to seek monetary damages.121 
115. Id. at 394, 420 N.E.2d at 363. 
116. Id. at 398, 420 N.E.2d at 366. 
117. Id. at 402, 420 N.E.2d at 367. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 405-06, 420 N.E.2d at 368. 
121. Id. at 406, 420 N.E.2d at 369. 
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The contract provision at issue in Wolf was unusually com-
plex, but it and the other cases discussed in this section serve 
to illustrate the uncertainties involved in both the ad hoc de-
termination of what is "reasonable," and efforts to predict 
whether equitable relief will be deemed appropriate. More-
over, these vagaries must be contemplated against the back-
drop of the expense and delay of litigation. 
II 
California's Statute: The Uncommon Law 
California courts have not adhered to the reasonableness 
test since 1872.122 In 1941, the California legislature enacted a 
statute which provides that "every contract by which anyone 
is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is to that extent void."123 The current 
statute invalidates most non-compete clauses and, while the 
statute's applicability to personal services contracts is settled, 
it applies only when a person is restrained from pursuing an 
entire trade, business, or profession, but does not prohibit par-
tial restraints.124 Thus,.the statute prohibits the complete "oc-
cupational ban" that is the core of the typical post-
employment non-compete covenant included in a broadcast 
news talent employment contract. 
California courts have generally upheld post-employment 
non-compete covenants limited to a prohibition against the 
former employee revealing trade secrets or confidential infor-
mation, such as customer lists.125 However, if the post-employ-
ment covenant is a general one based on territorial or 
122 .. See Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284, 288, 207 Cal. 
Rptr. 477, 480 (1984). 
123. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987). Several other states have simi-
lar, although generally less broad, statutes. See, e.g., A:LA. CODE §§ 22-24 (1958); 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1401 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12 (West 1972); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:932 (West 1964); MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN. § 445.761 (West 
1967); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-807 to 809 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 
to 11 (1967). 
124. Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971); Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 602 (1969). 
125. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985); 
Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. App. 3d 594, 180 Cal. Rptr. 451 
(1982). 
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durational restrictions, it is generally unenforceable.126 The 
rationale behind the statute and the courts' rulings is that 
non-compete covenants are against California's public 
policy.127 
Trade secrets, customer lists, and other proprietary informa-
tion are protected by other legal principles, including those of 
agency.128 Statutory exceptions exempt sales of businesses and 
dissolutions of partnerships from the prohibition.l29 A non-
compete covenant may be enforceable if it is ancillary to the 
sale of a business "whereby the seller covenants not to com-
pete in a specified geographic area for such time as the pur-
chaser or his successor in title continues to carry on that 
business. "130 Partners may agree not to compete within the 
same city or town in which the partnership transacted busi-
ness.131 Post-employment non-compete covenants are not cov-
126. See Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 
(1951); see also KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 
(1980). 
127. See Fidelity Credit Assur. Co. of Cal. v. Cosby, 90 Cal. App. 22, 265 P. 372 
(1928); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971). 
128. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a)-(d) (1957). 
129. See Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. University, 817 
F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987). 
130. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 35. The specific language of the statutory exception 
provides: 
Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or anY shareholder of a 
corporation selling or otherwise disposing of all his shares in said corpora-
tion, or any shareholder of a corporation which sells (a) all or substantially 
all of its operating assets together with the goodwill of the corporation, (b) 
all or substantially all of the operating assets of a division or a subsidiary of 
the corporation together with the goodwill of such division or subsidiary, or 
(c) all of the shares of any subsidiary, may agree with the buyer to refrain 
from carrying on a similar business within a specified county or counties, 
city or cities, or a part thereof, in which the business so sold, or that of said 
corporation, division, or subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the buyer, 
or any person deriving title to the goodwill or shares from him, carries on 
like business therein. For the purposes of this section, "subsidiary" shall 
mean any corporation, a majority of whose voting shares are owned by the 
selling corporation. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 1987). 
131. The specific language provides: 
Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of dissolution of the partnership, 
agree that he will not carry on a similar business· within a specified county 
or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, where the partnership business 
has been transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or any 
person deriving title to the business or its goodwill from any such other 
member of the partnership, carries on a like business therein. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1987). 
1989] NON-COMPETE COVENANTS 445 
ered by these exceptions and, hence, are void in California.132 
The reasonableness test applied in most jurisdictions has been 
rejected by California COurtS.133 
The effect of the California statute is to defeat post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants that are premised upon the uni-
queness of the employee's services. Presumably because of the 
statute, there are few California cases concerning post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants included in broadcast news or 
other public performance employment contracts. Two cases, 
however, serve to illustrate the principle and the limitations of 
the prohibition. 
KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulasl34 involved an action seeking to en-
join· the defendant from appearing clad in a chicken suit en-
semble after his employment with the plaintiff radio station 
had ended. Giannoulas entered into an employment agree-
ment with KGB which provided: "Employee agrees and ac-
knowledges that the costume, concept, and the KGB Chicken 
are the exclusive property of employer, and ... agrees not to 
take any action inconsistent with said rights of employer in 
and to the concept of the KGB Chicken."l35 
Mter KGB fired Giannoulas for removing his vest showing 
KGB's call letters, Giannoulas began to freelance in a "fowl" 
costume without a name. The trial court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining Giannoulas from appearing in a 
"chicken suit" at any sports or public event where a team 
from San Diego county appeared. 
The appellate court found that the prohibition "invalidly re-
strict[ed] Giannoulas' right to' earn a living and to express 
himself as an artist. "136 The court stated: 
Public policy disfav,ors injunctions restraining the right, to 
pursue a calling . . . . On the national scene, the weight of 
authority shows great reluctance to issue restraints unless the 
former employer can show irreparable injury. California goes 
beyond judicial reluctance to possible'illegality of such injunc-
tions . . . . Although there are a few statutory exceptions to 
the ban against restraints of trade, none of them applies . . . 
132. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985); 
Campbell, 817 F.2d at 502. But see Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. 
App. 3d 594, 180 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1982). 
133. Campbell, 817 F.2d at 502. 
134. 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980). 
135. Id. at 853, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580. 
136. Id. at 847, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576. 
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where the employer seeks to restrairi a performer from con-
tinuing to perform after the term of employment expires.137 
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley COrp.138 also illustrates the 
application of the California statute. In Muggill, the defend-
ants terminated the plaintiff's retirement benefits when, after 
leaving defendants' employ, the plaintiff went to work for a 
competing business. The Supreme Court of California held 
that the termination of Muggill's pension plan was a violation 
of the California statute in that it placed a restraint on the 
plaintiff's right to engage in a lawful business.139 The court 
said the statute "invalidates provisions in employment con-
tracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor 
after completion of his employment or imposing a penalty if 
he does so, unless they are necessary to protect the employer's 
trade secrets."140 These decisions leave little doubt that a typi-
cal broadcast news post-employment non-compete covenant 
would be flatly unenforceable in California. In jurisdictions 
where post-employment non-compete covenants are governed 
by common law, the situation is far less clear. 
III 
Validity of a Typical Post-Employment 
Non-Compete Covenant in a Broadcast 
Talent Employment Contract 
A non-compete covenant in a broadcast talent employment 
contract will be enforced "only to the extent that it is reason-
able in time and space, necessary to protect legitimate [em-
ployer] interests, and not an obstruction of the public 
interest. "141 
A. The Reasonableness Test Applied 
The following language is typical of post-employment non-
compete covenants commonly included in broadcast talent em-
ployment contracts: 
After this contract ends either by expiration or termination, 
the newscaster will not make on-the-air appearances on any 
137. Id. at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77. 
138. 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965). 
139. Id. at 243, 398 P.2d at 151, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
140. Id. at 242, 398 P.2d at 149, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 22. 
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other television or radio station operating within fifty miles of 
WXYZ studios for a period of two months for each year the 
newscaster was employed by WXYZ or for one year, which-
ever is less.l42 
Except in jurisdictions such as California, where a statute 
would void this clause, a test of its validity would require 
weighing the employer's interest in protecting its business 
against the employee's interest in avoiding restrictions on his 
ability to earn a livelihood. First, the clause must be reason-
able as to duration, geographic scope and range of activities 
prohibited. The cases discussed above indicate that it is likely 
a duration of one year and a geographic limitation of fifty 
miles would be found reasonable. With respect to the consid-
eration requirement, the non-compete clause, if included in an 
initial employment contract, is supported by the commence-
ment of employment.143 
The range of activities prohibited by this sample clause, 
however, is extremely broad, banning the former employee's 
pursuit of the occupation within the stipulated time period 
and area. Whether this prohibition is too broad to be enforced 
can only be determined with reference to the business interest 
which the former employer seeks to protect: the uniqueness 
of employee services. In the broadcast news context, as dis-
cussed above, "uniqueness" is often a euphemism for the em-
ployer's investment in the employee's popularity. 
Nevertheless, "uniqueness" is the rubric under which cove-
nants of this type are most often enforced. 
Because of the difficulty in showing uniqueness, broadcast 
talent employment contracts sometimes include "unique serv-
ices" clauses to bolster the enforceability of non-compete cove-
nants.144 Yet, despite the best efforts of broadcast employers' 
142. Litwin, Negotiating Media Contracts: Personal Service Contracts for On·Air 
Talent, 31 BOSTON B.J. 14, 16-17 (1987). 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97. 
144. The following language comprises a typical "unique services" clause: 
The services to be furnished by the newscaster hereunder and the rights 
granted by the newscaster hereunder are of a special character that gives 
them a unique value, the loss of which cannot be adequately or reasonably 
compensated for in damages in an action at law. The newscaster's failure to 
meet the obligations described in this agreement will cause the station ir-
reparable injury or damage for which the station will be entitled to seek 
and obtain injunctive or other equitable relief. The granting of such relief 
will not, however, be construed as a waiver of any other rights the station 
may have against the newscaster in law or in equity. 
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lawyers, no formal recitation by the parties to the contract 
will ever bind a court to the conclusion asserted therein. As 
one court stated, "in a court proceeding, the contractual recital 
regarding uniqueness of services may be admitted as eVidence, 
to . be weighed against the performer's affidavit to the con-
trary."145 Generally, employers will need to provide further 
evidence of the unique nature of employee's services.l46 Mere 
contractual recitals of uniqueness will not stand against the 
court's own finding to the contrary.147 
The focus on "uniqueness" and how to prove it misses the 
point. The business interest for which the former employer 
seeks protection is not any inherent uniqueness in the services 
rendered by the former employee. These services, after all, 
are far more like those of other broadcast talents than they 
are different. Rather, the employer seeks to protect its invest-
ment in the employee's audience popularity within the broad-
cast market. . This fact is implicitly acknowledged in many 
"unique services" clauses, which make the duration of the pro-
hibition dependent on the length of employment. Another 
measure of the former employer's investment in the former 
employee is the former employee's position in the employer's 
hierarchy, often indicated by salary.· 
Bradford v. New York Times CO.,148 while not based on a 
broadcast news employment contract, nevertheless illustrates 
the use of employee importance, rather than uniqueness, as a 
basis for enforcing a post-employment non-compete covenant. 
The Bradford court found a protectable employer interest in 
the mere fact that Bradford had occupied a high position in 
the New York Times organization.149 The court simply 
equated high position with unique services.l50 In addition, it is 
at least possible that Bradford's high salary persuaded the 
court, if only intuitively, that the New York Times had, in ef-
fect, "purchased" the covenant.151 The seeming pro-employer 
Litwin, supra note 142, at 17. 
145. KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel, 527 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). 
146. Id. See also Harry Rogers Theatrical Enterprises, Inc. v. Comstock, 232 
N.Y.S. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
147. Id. See, e.g., Fredrick Bros. Artists Corp: v. Yates, 186 Misc. 871, 61 N.Y.S.2d 
478 (1946), rev'd, 271 N.Y. 69, 62 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1946); Dockstader v. Reed, 121 N.Y. 
846, 106 N.Y.S. 795 (1907). 
148. 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
149. 501 F.2d at 58. 
150. Id. 
151. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 550. 
1989] NON-COMPETE COVENANTS 449 
bias of this rationale in the employment contract context has 
led some critics ~o propose the use of other legal principles, 
such as those of agency and fiduciary responsibility: . 
Using contract rules to evaluate a covenant's validity pennits 
the courts to enforce occupational bans that give more protec-
tion from competition to [an employer's] interests than is le-
gitimately justified.152 
The restrictive covenants typically used by broadcast compa-
nies are vulnerable to challenges of at least two types. First, it 
can be argued that a particular covenant is unreasonable, 
either in part or in its entirety. The more fundamental attack 
challenges, on policy grounds, the validity of post-employment 
non-compete covenants in general. The latter challenge is not 
likely to succeed in states that have not enacted statutes curb-
ing the use of such covenants, but even a court unwilling to 
engage in "judicial legislation" might find the policy argu-
ments an adequate basis for heightened scrutiny with respect 
to reasonableness and the employer's business interest. 
B. Policy Considerations 
1. Public Interest 
The policy arguments against enforcement would seem es-
pecially persuasive when an employer has terminated an em-
ployee or is using a post-employment restriction to pressure an 
employee not to quit. In the latter instance, one court has 
observed: 
A covenant that serves primarily to bar an employee from 
working for others or for himself in the same competitive 
field so as to discourage him from terminating his employ-
152. Id. at 548. Closius and Schaffer propose that the common law rules of agency 
and unfair competition, rather than the rules of contract, should govern the enforce-
ability of post-employment non-compete covenants. Id. at 532-35. Their position is 
that, generally, only trade secrets, customer lists, and the like constitute legitimately 
protectable employer business interests and that contract law, correctly applied, adds 
nothing to the protection afforded by agency and related legal principles. Id. at 548. 
The Second Restatement of Agency provides that the agent may continue to use 
personal skills, including those acquired or honed during the course of the agency, as 
well as generally known or available information regarding the business. REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b)-(d) (1957). 
The potential utility of this argument in the context of broadcast news employ-
ment contracts, however, is undercut by Closius and Schaffer themselves, who 
would make an exception for an employee "with acknowledged expertise and repu-
tation within an industry who fills a significant position within the [employer's] busi-
ness," and who "possesses bargaining power equal to that of the [employer]." 
Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 550. 
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ment is a form of industrial peonage without redeeming vir-
tue in the American economic order.1s3 
The court's reference to the "economic order" shifts the focus 
away from fairness to the individual, and sounds the theme of 
social utility-a theme that runs through much of the policy 
discussion regarding post-employment non-compete covenants. 
The question then becomes whether society is better off with 
the enforcement of restrictive covenants in a particular indus-
try or business. 
It can be argued that the public interest is best served by 
the enforcement of at least some post-employment non-com-
pete covenants because they protect, and therefore encourage, 
employer investment, which results in better products and 
services. It would be extremely difficult, however, to demon-
strate this proposition in broadcast news, where it is unclear 
what "better" means or how it can be measured. 
The public interest argument against enforcement is also 
largely economic. The court in Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. 
Strauman 154 described the economic system's need for "the 
uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas"155 and went on 
to state that "no restrictions should fetter an employee's right 
to apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge 
acquired by ... his previous employment."156 
The potentially significant collective economic impact of 
post-employment non-compete restraints has led many au-
thors to advocate application of the rules and principles of an-
titrust law to the covenants.157 The Sherman Antitrust Act 
proscribes "every contract in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states."158 This seemingly absolute prohibi-
153. Josten's, Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Md. 1974). 
154. 40 N.Y.2d 303, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). 
155. [d. at 307, 353 N.E.2d at 593. 
156. [d. 
157. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Antitrust~ Neglected Step-child: A Proposal for Deal-
ing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 
(1973); Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Post-
Employment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621. 
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The commerce clause of the Constitution has long been 
construed as giving Congress significant power over not only interstate activities, but 
also intrastate labor-management relations. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 
(1937). Also, although 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976) states that hUman labor is not a com-
modity or article of commerce, this definition was developed to create room (within 
the antitrust arena) for labor unions to operate legally. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l 
Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1967). 
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tion has long been tempered; however, by the "rule of rea-
son."159 Perhaps as a result, every post-employment restraint 
tested under the rule has survived.l60 
In Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. GroSS,161 for example, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "employee 
agreements not to compete are proper subjects for scrutiny 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. "162 In concluding that 
the restriction at issue was reasonable, and therefore enforcea-
ble, the court cited the covenantee's "legitimate interest" in 
preventing the covenantor from competing for customers of 
the covenantee.l63 
Newburger involved a securities brokerage firm, rather than 
a broadcasting company, but nevertheless demonstrates that 
an antitrust analysis ultimately tests the covenant against a 
standard not appreciably different from the previously dis-
cussed standard for non-compete covenants under basic con-
tract law-the test of reasonableness.l64 Arguing that the 
economic issues remain relevant, however, noted antitrust 
159. See Standard oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-60 (1910) (acknowledging 
that every contract restrains trade and, therefore, the prohibition cannot be 
absolute). 
160. See, e.g., Bradford v. New York Times Co., SOl F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Frackowiak v. Farmer Ins. Co., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D. Kan. 1976); Alders 
v. A.F.A. Corp. of Fla., 353 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Miller v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (E.D. Wis. 1971). 
At least one author has argued that the survival of the restrictions under antitrust 
analysis results from the courts' failure to consider labor market impact, as opposed 
to product market impact. Product market analysis is the traditional approach, but 
labor market analysis has been employed in some sports cases. Note, The Antitrust 
Implications of Employee Non-compete Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 519 (1982) (citing Radovich v. N.F.L., 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); 
Mackey v. N.F.L., 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 
(1977». 
161. 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977). 
162. Id. at 1082. 
When a company interferes with free competition for one of its former 
employee's services, the market's ability to achieve the most economically 
efficient allocation of labor is impaired .... Morever, employee-noncompe-
tition clauses can tie up industry expertise and experience . . .. Restraints 
on postemployment competition that serve no legitimate purpose at the 
time they are adopted would be per se invalid . . . . Even if the clause is not 
overbroad per se, it might still be scrutinized for unreasonableness: Are the 
restrictions so burdensome that their anticompetitive purposes and effects 
outweigh their justifications? Restraints that fail this balancing test might 
be struck down under a rule of reason. 
Id. 
163. Id. at 1082-83. 
164. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
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scholar Professor Sullivan has suggested that "the courts 
should take into account market impact ~ a more explicit and 
more serious manner than they have so far."l65 He advocates 
a five-factor analysis for evaluation of post-employment non-
compete covenants: (1) the totality of the anti-competitive re-
straints imposed by the employer involved and not merely 
those of one plaintiff; (2) the extent to which there is a pat-
tern of such restraints in the relevant industry; (3) the state of 
competition in the industry, generally, and in the relevant geo-
graphic market; (4) the scope of the restraint's prohibition and 
the remedy provided in the contract for noncompliance; and 
(5) the nature of the employee restrained, with special disfa-
vor for restraints on employees who are particularly valuable 
to competitors. Additionally, Professor Sullivan suggests that 
courts subject proffered employer justifications to a higher de-
gree of scrutiny.166 
2. Individual Rights 
A second and distinct set of policy questions concerns the 
applicability and impact of the concept of individual rights. 
Beneath the simplicity of the phrase "freedom of contract" is 
the conflict between the sanctity of one contract (here, an 
agreement not to compete) and an individual's freedom to 
make a second contract (for the sale. of one's personal serv-
ices). Indeed, freedom of contract is a misnomer if what is 
meant is that parties should be free to agree on whatever 
terms they like, and that the state, through its judicial appara-
tus, should enforce those agreements. Reality is neither so 
simple nor so absolute. 
Judicial refusal to enforce contracts involving fraud, duress 
or incapacity, for example, is at once a prerequisite of, and an 
exception to, freedom of contract.167 It is a prerequisite be-
cause freedom of contract is generally thought to be meaning-
ful only when parties with contractual capacity act 
voluntarily.16s Even when these conditions are met, however, 
the parties are not entirely free to do as they please, for the 
165. Sullivan, supra note 157, at 647. 
166. Id. at 647-49 
167. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 
With Special Rfiference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 
MD. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1982). Professor Duncan Kennedy describes this as "the 
constitutive character of the exceptions to enforcement." Id. 
168. Id. 
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doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability give courts 
broad latitude to adjust or avoid otherwise valid agreements.169 
One difficulty in applying the doctrine of unconscionability 
to employment contracts in broadcast news is that the doc-
trine is most often invoked in situations involving unequal 
bargaining power.17° A relatively wen-paid broadcast newsper-
son may not appear to need this particular type of protection. 
Perhaps the real issue is the difficulty of protecting the em-
ployee from his or her own willingness to enter into a bad bar-
gain.l71 Blatantly paternalistic treatment· of highly-paid, 
skilled, professional adults may seem ill-conceived, but there 
is abundant precedent for this in legislation regarding 
mandatory use of seat belts, the social security system, and the 
federal system of securities regulation. The question is 
whether the prospective freedom to sell one's services is an 
interest whose alienation the law should regulate, or even for-
bid.172 The idea that freedom to ply one's trade is an interest 
"owned" by each individually is neither radical nor noveP73 
To conclude that this interest should be inalienable, however, 
requires a second, more difficult step. Prohibitions against 
selling oneself into slavery or agreeing to be murdered are 
scarcely controversial, but the analogy to an agreement not to 
do a particular kind of work in a particular area during a par-
ticular period of time seems wholly theoretical and quite at-
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 614-15. See also U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1978) (on unconscionability). 
"The principle is one of the prevention of oppression." Id. 
171. Kennedy, supra note 167, at 634. "Courts using the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility like to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargaining power ... [bJut it's 
often obvious that they are concerned not with power but with naivete." Id. 
172. See generally Calebresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedra~ 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). There are 
three types of "entitlements": those protected by property rules, those protected by 
liability rules, and those that are inalienable. "An entitlement is inalienable to the 
extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller." Id. at 1092-93. 
173. See J. LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT ch. V (P. Laslett rev. ed. 
1963). "Every Man has a Property in his own Person .... The Labour of his Body 
and the Work of his Hands ... are properly his." Id. at § 27 (emphasis in original). 
See also J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (R. Hildreth trans. 4th ed. 1882) 
("The idea of property consists in an established expectation."); Lynch v. Household 
Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1971) ("[TJhe dichotomy between personal liberties 
and property rights is a false one . . .. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists 
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither 
could have meaning without the other."). See generally Radin, Properly and Per-
sonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
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tenuated.174 There would be little basis for objection if, during 
the period of restraint, the covenantor was paid not to work. 
This differs from the typical situation, however, only because 
in the typical situation the covenantor is, arguably, paid in ad-
vance not to work during the period of the restraint. 
Despite these difficulties with the individual rights argu-
ment, it seems likely that the California statute is motivated, 
at least in part, by related concerns. This would tend to ex-
plain the California statute's exception for sales of businesses 
and dissolutions of partnerships. Presumably, additional sup-
port for the statutory prohibition came from concerns regard-
ing efficiency and social utility which were, perhaps, merely 
intuitive. These issues are difficult to specify and still more 
difficult to assess empirically.175 
IV 
Enforcement: the Practice in the Industry 
The results of a recent informal survey conducted by the au-
thor afford some insight into the practices of television sta-
tions in this country's top broadcast markets with respect to 
post-employment non-compete covenants.176 Nearly all (96%) 
of the stations responding to the survey have written employ-
ment agreements with most of their on-air talent. The great 
majority of these stations (80%) use a "standard form" con-
tract to define the relationship. The written talent contracts 
employed by 76% of the stations "always" include post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants; nearly all the remaining 
stations require such covenants "sometimes." 
Of the stations that use post-employment non-compete cove-
nants, the duration of these covenants ranged from thirty days 
to one year. For news anchors, the most common (60%) dura-
tion of restriction was one year. For reporters, one year re-
strictions were also most common (50%), but six month 
174. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 172, at 1113-15 & nn. 45-51. 
175. The legislative history of, and cases interpreting the California statute say 
little more than that restraints on otherwise lawful employment are violative of Cal-
ifornia's public policy. See, e.g., supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text. 
176. As part of the research for this Article, the author mailed a written question-
naire (and a duplicate follow-up to non-respondents) to the news directors of com-
mercial broadcast television stations in the country's top twenty broadcast markets. 
Seventy-nine questionnaires were mailed;·thirty-six responses were received. Survey 
results are available from the author and at COMM/ENT. 
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restrictions were not unusual (30%). Regarding geographical 
scope, all but two respondents indicated that the restrictions 
employed by their stations prohibited competition within the 
immediate broadcast market. One news director indicated 
that his station uses contract language prohibiting post-em-
ployment competition within a 100 mile radius. Another indi-
cated that his station attempts to prohibit competition within a 
75 mile radius. 
Approximately one-half of the respondents indicated that 
they or their stations had sought to enforce post-employment 
non-compete covenants. More than 90% of these efforts were 
successful. Most (64%) of the successful efforts reportedly in-
volved litigation. One respondent indicated that his station 
had twice used litigation to delay resolution of the issue be-
yond the period of the restriction and then reached a settle-
ment. A slight majority of the responding news directors 
indicated that they thought post-employment non-compete 
covenants were valuable because they were legally enforcea-
ble.l77 A smaller, but significant, group (21%) indicated that 
they thought the covenants were "valuable because employees 
voluntarilyabided."178 Still smaller groups of respondents in-
dicated that they thought the covenants were "valuable be-
cause employers enforce them by 'gentlemen's agreement'" 
(15%), or "not valuable" (6%).179 
The paucity of case law resulting from efforts to enforce 
post-employment non-compete covenants in broadcast talent 
contracts may result from "the uncertain state of the law with 
respect to the circumstances in which prohibitory injunctions 
may be granted or denied [making] both the artist and the em-
177. Respondents who indicated that they thought post-employment non-compete 
covenants were valuable. because they were legally enforceable included one news 
director at a California station. However, such covenants are clearly unenforceable 
in California. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. 
178. While it is possible that employees voluntarily abide because they believe 
that the non-compete covenants are fair, it is also possible that many employees 
think that the covenants are unfair and even unenforceable. The principal problem 
with ad hoc determinations of what is "reasonable" is that this approach makes liti-
gation virtually inevitable in the event of a dispute. Therefore, employees, who typi-
cally have fewer resources than employers, are likely to abide simply because they 
are effectively intimidated. Cj Sullivan, supra note 157, at 622-23. 
179. With respect to this inquiry, the combined percentages exceed 100% because 
respondents were invited to check as many responses as accurately reflected their 
views. One respondent indicated that he or she thought the covenants were valuable 
because they were legally enforceable, but added a question mark. 
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ployer wary of waging an appellate court case at considerable 
expense."180 The burden of this uncertainty weighs more 
heavily upon the employee, though, because the employer is 
almost certain to have superior resources. Thus, "[f]or every 
covenant that finds its way into court, there are thousands 
which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees ... ' ."181 
Judicial enforcement of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants is less frequent in the broadcast news industry than is 
voluntary compliance by covenantors and potential employers 
who decline to hire them. 
In other contexts, voluntary compliance with unenforceable 
contract provisions often results from ari erroneous belief in 
judicial enforceability. In this instance, however, it appears 
that the players (employers, employees, and potential employ-
ers) comply not because they are unaware of, for example, 
the California statute, but because of extrajudicial enforce-
ment, or the fear of it. 
Such extrajudicial enforcement is accomplished primarily in 
two ways: through an unspoken agreement among employers 
in the broadcast industry that they will not "raid each other's 
shops"; and through the fears of employees that their reputa-
tions, and hence marketability, will be jeopardized if they fail 
to honor 'agreements into which they have knowingly entered. 
The anti-shop-raiding consensus among employers is based on 
a well-founded belief that the non-compete covenant may be 
the only protection that employers have against greatly inten-
sified salary competition for talent. The demise of non-com-
pete covenants might, under certain conditions, unleash a 
virtual price war, which would benefit talent but would proba-
bly do employers, as a class, more harm than good. In addi-
tion, in the background lurks the possibility that hiring an 
employee in violation of the post-employment non-compete 
covenant could subject a subsequent employer to tort liability 
for intentional interference with business relations.182 
180. Grogan, supra note 98, at 492. 
181. Blake, supra note 9, at 682. 
182. See, e.g., Gorman Publishing Co. v. Stillman, 516 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Ill. 
1980). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-774A (1977) (discus-
sion of intentional interference with contractual relationships). 
Of course, an employee-covenantor willing to undertake the expense of litigation 
may attempt to assuage the fears of prospective employers by seeking a declaratory 
judgment. For example, Clooney v. WCPO TV Div. of Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
Co., 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973), involved a television personality who 
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The employee must consider not only the possibility of be-
ing shunned by the fraternity of broadcast news employers, 
but also the high cost of litigation and the very real possibility 
that the final determination of even eventually successful liti-
gation might not occur until after the post-employment re-
striction has expired. "While taking each case on its merits is 
an appealing approach, it is an approach which tends to place 
litigation expense burdens on defendants (former employees) 
who as a class are frequently not in an economic position to 
test their rights."183 Ultimately, therefore, post-employment 
non-compete covenants are likely to. be effective, whether ju-
dicially enforceable or not, because of the functional intimida-
tion born of grossly unequal resources.l84 
V 
Alternative Proposals 
The burden resulting from the confused state of the law re-
garding non-compete' covenants is borne disproportionately by 
employees who, with inferior resources, often must undertake 
expensive litigation to secure, or even ascertain, their rights. 
In order to address this problem, the law should be made clear 
and, ideally, uniform. Alternative approaches to clarification 
of this area of the law are discussed below. 
A. Statutory Prohibition 
The straightest path to clarity and uniformity would be the 
enactment by each jurisdiction in the United States of legisla-
tion similar to that adopted in California.18s Presumably, most 
employers would oppose such a wide-reaching prohibition on 
post-employment non-compete covenants. Although it might 
be difficult for these employers to show that California's stat-
ute has caused actual loss to California employers, the success 
hosted a one hour program five days per week. His employment contract included a 
one year post-employment restriction prohibiting competition within 100 miles of 
WCPO. Id. at 125, 300 N.E.2d at 257. The contract also stated that Clooney's services 
were "special, unique, unusual, [and of an] extraordinary" character. Id. Upon leav-
ing WCPO, Clooney sought a declaratory judgment that the restriction was unen-
forceable. Ultimately, the restriction was upheld on the basis that its provisions 
were reasonable given Clooney's "unique services." Id. at 126-28, 300 N.E.2d at 258-
59. 
183. Milgram on Trade Secrets, 12 Bus. Org. (MB) 3-l21 (1988). 
184. Blake, supra note 9, at 682-88. . 
185. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
458 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11 :423 
of extrajudicial enforcement in California may largely be at-
tributable to judicial enforceability elsewhere, and effective 
nationwide prohibition of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants would soon unravel the scheme of extrajudicial enforce-
ment. Although this is probably true, a scheme based largely 
upon intimidation and disproportionate power arguably should 
be unraveled. 
B. Statutory Regulation 
Legislatures unwilling to prohibit post-employment non-
compete covenants that are premised upon the uniqueness ra-
tionale might consider the less extreme step of statutory regu-
lation. Either or both of two requirements could be imposed. 
1. Minimum Compensation 
A post-employment non-compete covenant premised upon 
the uniqueness rationale could, by statute, be made enforcea-
ble only if the employee in question is highly paid. Statuto;. 
rily-specified minimum compensation would reduce the 
number of post-employment restrictions employers seek to 
impose and simultaneously ensure that the restrictions that 
were imposed would affect only employees in whom the em-
ployer had made a more substantial investment. In addition, 
statutory minimum compensation as a condition to the en-
forceability of post-employment non-compete covenants would 
increase the likelihood that contesting employees would be 
able to afford legal assistance. 
The above proposition finds support in that, although appar-
ently not applicable to post-employment restrictions, one Cali-
fornia statute establishes minimum annual compensation as a 
prerequisite to the grant of an injunction to prevent the 
breach of a personal services contract.1S6 
186. The general rule in California is that personal services contracts cannot be 
specifically enforced. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390 (Deering 1984). There is an exception, 
however, and thus injunctions may be granted to prevent the breach of such con-
tracts which are "in writing ... where the minimum compensation for such service 
is at the rate of not less than six thousand dollars per annum and where the prom-
ised service is of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character, 
which gives it peculiar value .... " Id. at § 3423(5). See also CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE 
§ 526(5) (West 1979). The $6,000 figure was adopted in a 1919 amendment. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3423(5). It is now absurdly low, but has not been subsequently amended; 
thus, the principle remains the same. 
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2. Employer Investment 
It is suggested throughout this Article that the only legiti-
mate employer's interest in the "uniqueness" of a broadcast 
news employee's services is the employer's investment in pro-
moting (advertising) the employee. This fact should be explic-
itly and statutorily acknowledged in legislation that need not 
be limited to the broadcast news industry. This proposition is 
not unprecedented: a Louisiana statute declares void any non-
compete agreement that the employer may "require or direct 
any employee to enter into." However, such a restriction may 
be enforceable if it does not exceed two years, and if "the em-
ployer incurs an expense in the training of the employee or 
incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business .... "187 
Legislation following this model should make clear that the 
expense incurred must be substantial. Also, it should be made 
clear that the referenced advertisement must connect the em-
ployee-covenantor with the business.1ss 
C. Common Law Clarity and Candor 
The approach least likely to produce uniformity and predict-
ability is the present common law system of ad hoc determina-
tion of the restriction's reasonableness. Nevertheless, this 
system could be greatly improved if courts making these de-
terminations would be clear and candid about the employer's 
business interest and the economic issues (e.g., potential mar-
ket impact). A more precise focus on these issues would allow 
the underlying policy considerations to guide the development 
of this area of law in a rational direction and, hence, toward a 
greater degree of clarity and predictability. 
Conclusion 
Most radio and television personalities are willing to sign 
employment contracts including post-employment non-com-
pete covenants because of the compensation promised in the 
contract.189 As a re~ult, post-employment non-compete cove-
187. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1985). 
188. Louisiana courts have so construed the Louisiana statute. See Nalco Chemi-
cal Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. La. 1965), off'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965). 
189. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. See also Litwin, supra note 
142. 
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nants are quite common in broadcast talent contracts.l90 Judi-
cial enforcement of the covenants is unacceptably 
unpredictable, however, and extrajudicial enforcement makes 
a mockery of the law. 
The principal problem with judicial enforcement is the am-
biguity and questionable relevance of the "unique services" ra-
tionale. In the broadcast news context, this rationale should 
be abandoned in favor of an examination of the extent to 
which the employer has invested in the local marketability of 
the employee. 
The surest path to greater consistency is statutory reform. 
Prohibitions such as the California statute, however, may only 
serve to increase instances of extrajudicial enforcement. A 
compromise solution should link enforceability to employer 
investment and minimum compensation. 
190. Litwin, supra note 142, at 17. 
